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Growing public concern' has resulted in the enactment of sev-
eral significant statutes to control the needless degradation of our
natural environment.2 Certainly "the broadest and perhaps most
important" of these statutes3 is the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA).4  NEPA "takes the major step of requir-
ing all federal agencies to consider values of environmental preser-
vation in their spheres of activity. . ."5 In addition, the Act es-
tablishes operating procedures for all federal agencies to follow in
planning activities which will have an impact on the environment. 6
In order to comply with NEPA, an agency undertaking a major
federal project which will have a significant impact on the environ-
ment must prepare an environmental impact statement. 7 The
preparation of this statement will, in general terms, require the
agency to investigate and study the impact of the proposed project
1. This concern is reflected in President Nixon's State of the Union Message:
Restoring nature to its natural state is a cause beyond party and beyond
factions. It has become a common cause of all people of this country. It
is the cause of particular concern to young Americans because they will
reap the grim consequences of our failure to act on programs which are
needed now if we are to prevent disaster later--clean air, clean water,
,open spaces. These should once again be the birthright of every American.
If we act now they can be. Address by President Nixon, Jan. 22, 1970,
reprinted in N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1970, § 1, at 22, col. 4.
2. See, e.g., Environmental Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1531-36 (1970);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (1970); Water and Environmental Quality
Improvement Act, id. §§ 4371-74 (1970); Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
Pub. L. No. 92-500 (Oct. 4, 1972), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5288 (1972).
3. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
4. 42 U.S.C. 9H 4321-47 (1970).
5. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
6. 115 CoNG. REc. 40416 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson). See gener-
ally Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 230 (1970); Note,
The National Environmental Policy Act: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing?, 37 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 139 (1970); Note, A Panoramic View of the National Environmental Policy
Act, 16 How. L. 116 (1970); Note, NEPA: Full of Sound and Fury ..... 6 U.
RIcHMoND L. REv. 116 (1971); 58 VA. L. REV. 177 (1972).
7. In preparing an impact statement, an agency is required to collect and
study data relating to five factors set forth in NEPA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C)
(i)-(v) (1970). For the full text of this portion of NEPA, see note 11 infra.
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on the environment, to consider alternatives to the proposed ac-
tion, and to justify environmental costs if the decision is made to con-
tinue the project. The manner of preparation of these statements
and the merits of the decisions made in light of the environmental
studies have increasingly become the objects of judicial scrutiny.
As one commentator has pointed out, "the restoration and mainten-
ance of a livable environment is, to a large extent, the problem of
the control of administrative agencies by the courts."
The ensuing discussion will focus on two major unresolved is-
sues in the problem area of judicial scrutiny of administrative de-
cisions affecting the environment: First, if an agency has fully com-
plied with NEPA requirements that an impact statement be pre-
pared, did Congress intend that the actual decision of the agency on
the merits be reviewed under the substantive provisions of NEPA?
Second, if the decision is to be subject to judicial scrutiny, what is
the standard of review?
Judicial Review of Agency Decisions on the Merits Under Section
101
Section 101 of NEPA broadly declares that it is a continuing
federal policy and responsibility "to use all practicable means, con-
sistent with other essential considerations of national policy" to
achieve, maintain, and preserve a quality environment for the na-
tion.9 Section 102 establishes what are commonly designated as
8. Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of
Administrative Law, 70 CoLum. L. Rav. 612, 615 (1970). Congress also realized
that federal agencies have a great impact on the environment: "Virtually every
agency of the Federal Government plays some role in determining how well the
environment is managed." S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969).
9. The ensuing discussion will focus on the specific language in § 101:
(a) The -Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's ac-
tivity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment,
particularly the profound influences of population growth, high-density
urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and ex-
panding technological advances and recognizing further the critical im-
portance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall
welfare and development of man, declares that it is the continuing policy
of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local govern-
ments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to use all
practicable means and measures, including financial and technical assist-
ance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to
create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other require-
ments of present and future generations of Americans.
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is
the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all prac-
ticable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national
[Vol. 1973:157
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"action-forcing" procedures'0 to implement the environmental goals
of section 101.11 In litigation involving these sections of the Act,
the courts have uniformly held that judicial review is available to
policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and
resources to the end that the Nation may-
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the en-
vironment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and estheti-
cally and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and un-
intended consequences;(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our
national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which
supports diversity and variety of individual choice;(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which
will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities;
and (6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
(c) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a health-
ful environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to
the preservation and enhancement of the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4331
(1970).
10. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969). The "action-forcing"
procedures are statutory provisions designed to assure that the agencies plan and
work toward maintaining and enhancing our environment. Id. Basically, the pro-
visions consist of procedural requirements that an agency utilize the social sciences
in planning a project, develop methods to quantify environmental cost, prepare
impact statements, and cooperate with state and local government and with the
Council on Environmental Quality. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). For a portion of
the text of this statute, see note 11 inf ra.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) provides in part:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent pos-
sible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States
shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set
forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government
shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure
the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental
design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact
on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation
with the Council on Environmental Quality established by subchapter II
of this chapter, which will insure that presently unquantified environ-
mental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in
decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible
official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's en-
vironment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productiv-
ity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Vol. 1973:157]
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determine whether an agency has fully complied with the "action-
forcing" procedural requirements of section 102.12 However, no
such judicial uniformity exists on the issue of whether there is sub-
stantive review of an agency decision under section 101. A funda-
mental conflict exists between courts as to the nature and effect of
section 101 and as to the judicial role in reviewing agency deci-
sions under this section.' 3
Substantive Review: Two Views. Two contradictory lines of
reasoning pervade the case law on the question of whether NEPA
permits courts to review the merits of an agency decision. The rea-
soning of those courts which refuse to make such a review is most
cogently presented in the 1971 decision by the District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Corps of Engineers.14  Environmental Defense Fund (EDE) sought
to enjoin the construction of the Gillham Dam across the Cossatot
River in Arkansas. Although unpersuaded by much of the reason-
ing embodied in the Corps' impact statement,'; the district court
nevertheless held that no reasonable interpretation of NEPA would
allow review of the agency decision on the merits under the policies
set forth in section 101.16
As the district court viewed the problem, the ultimate de-
cision as to whether to pursue a project must be made by the agency.
Substantive review, the court concluded, would result in the judici-
ary's substituting its judgment for that of the agency;' 7 therefore,
plaintiffs were relegated to mere review of procedural compliance
12. See, e.g., Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972);
Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, Hanly v. Kleindienst, 409 U.S. 990 (1972); Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Daly v.
Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Wash. 1972); Note, Evolving Judicial Standards
Under the National Environmental Policy Act and the Challenge of the Alaska
Pipeline, 81 YALE LL 1592 (1972).
13. See note 20 infra and accompanying text.
14. 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (maintaining injunction against con-
struction of dam). This injunction was dissolved in Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark.), af'd on other grounds,
470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
15. 325 F. Supp. at 760-62. See note 68 infra.
16. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728,
738 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
17. 325 F. Supp. at 755. Accord, Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 340 F.
Supp. 222, 228 (M.D.N.C. 1972), rev'd, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
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with the Act.' The district court thus viewed NEPA as a full dis-
closure law, requiring only strict procedural compliance. 9 Since
the 1971 decision in Environmental Defense Fund, numerous courts
have specifically followed this reasoning.20
The second line of cases 2 '-decisions which have indicated or
18. 325 F. Supp. at 755. Accord, Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 340 F.
Supp. 222, 225 (M.D.N.C. 1972), rev'd, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam);
Bucklien v. Volpe, 2 BNA ENViRONmNT REP. - CAS. 1082, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
19. 325 F. Supp. at 755. Accord, Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 340 F.
Supp. 222, 225 (M.D.N.C. 1972), rev'd, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1973).
20. The reasoning and judicial approach reflected in the district court opinion
have been cited and adopted by many other courts. See Bradford Township v.
Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 463 F.2d 537 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 41
U.S.L.W. 3313 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1972); McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir.
1971); Pizitz v. Volpe, 4 BNA Environmental Rep.-Cas. 1195 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd
mem. 467 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps
of Eng'rs, 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Bucklien v. Volpe, 2 BNA ENvmON-
MENTAL REP.-CAs. 1082 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
The Fifth Circuit's position is unclear. Although it affirmed per curian the
district court holding that there is no substantive review, Pizitz v. Volpe, 467 F.2d
208 (5th Cir. 1972), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has never squarely
confronted this issue. In Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th
Cir. 1973), the court stated
that it is not the province of the courts to review any actual decision on
the merits . . . as to the desirability vel non of the project. We merely
hold that it is the courts' function to insure that the mandate of the statute
has been carried out and that all relevant environmental effects of the
project be given appropriate consideration. . ..
However, in Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 211 (5th Cir. 1970), the court said that
[tihis Act essentially states that every federal agency shall consider
ecological factors when dealing with activities which may have an impact
on man's environment.
In both of these cases, the court was concerned with other sections of the Act; and
these statements are dicta.
21. Several other courts have held that there is substantive review under § 101.
See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1972);
National Resources Council, Inc. v. Morton, 485 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FP.C, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 926 (1972); City of New York v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 929 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); Lathan v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 262 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
Until recently the Fourth Circuit's position was unclear. In Ely v. Velde,
451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971), the court initially indicated that it would allow
substantive review. Then, after a period of some confusion, the Fourth Circuit held
that there was substantive review under section 101 of NEPA. Conservation Council
v. Froehlke, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam), rev'g 340 F. Supp. 222
(M.D.N.C. 1972).
Furthermore, the Council on Environmental Quality, in its third annual re-
port, stated:
NEPA commands firmly that an agency must, to the fullest extent pos-
sible, take environmental values into account. . . . If an agency fails...
it can be ordered to comply by a court. But neither NEPA's substantive
duty nor its 102 process purports to dictate the agency's choice of a course
Vol. 1973:157]
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held that NEPA permits substantive judicial review-is most clearly
illustrated by the Eighth Circuit's decision in Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers.2  The court of appeals,
which rejected the lower court's analysis, reasoned that "NEPA
was intended to effect substantive changes in decision making. '2
The Act commands the agency to balance environmental factors
against the economic and technical factors involved in each proj-
ect; therefore, the court concluded, since the agencies had an "obli-
gation" to carry out the substantive requirements of NEPA, the
"courts have an obligation to review .. . agency decisions on the
merits. '2 4
Substantive Review: Analysis. Section 10 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA) provides the basic framework for a de-
termination of whether a given statute permits substantive judical
review. 25  Section 10 entities a person adversely affected or ag-
grieved by agency action to judicial review26 "except to the extent
that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law."12 7  Construing this statute,
the Supreme Court has found that the APA has a broad remedial
purpose; this purpose, the Court has indicated, counsels judicial
hospitality to the claim that section 10 has expanded the avail-
ability of judicial review.28
The landmark decision defining the scope of the first excep-
tion to judicial review of agency actions-that is, review precluded
by statute-is Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.20  The Court, reiter-
of action. . . . The courts have uniformly said that, after an agency has
considered environmental effects, its decision to act is subject to limitedjudicial review ... . 3 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ANN. REP.
253-54 (1972).
22. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.), affg on other grounds, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.
Ark. 1972).
23. Id. at 297.
24. Id. at 298.
25. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970). The APA applies to "each authority" of the
federal government except certain enumerated authorities such as Congress, federal
courts, courts-martial, and territorial governments. Id. § 551(1). None of these ex-
ceptions are relevant to the discussion in the text nor to the application of NEPA.
26. Id. § 702.
27. Id. § 701.
28. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1953). See Association of Data
Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970); Rusk v.
Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962); Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51
(1954).
29. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
[Vol. 1973:157
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ating that the APA provides generously for judicial review, held
that "review of a final agency action. . will not be cut off unless
there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of
Congress.13 0  Court decisions reflect a strong presumption that fi-
nal agency action is reviewable absent express statutory language
to the contrary. 11 Furthermore, where the statute explicitly precludes
judicial review, the courts have, on occasion, narrowly construed
the precluding language; 32 thus, even statutory provisions stating
that the agency action is final have often been held not to bar judi-
cial review.3 3  There clearly is no language in NEPA which ex-
pressly precludes judicial review.3 4
Absent an express statutory denial of judicial review, courts
will not restrict access to judicial review unless a contrary legis-
lative intent is shown by "clear and convincing evidence."35 In fact,
Professor Jaffe has said that "at least in the post-APA statutes, it
requires . . . a statutory provision explicitly directed to the exclu-
sion of judicial review to rebut the presumption of the APA in fa-
30. Id. at 140. See Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 410 (1971); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156-57 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166-67
(1970); Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185 (1956). See also DAvis § 28.08,
at 33; JAFFE 353-76.
31. JAFFE 353. See note 30 supra.
32. See Tracy v. Gleason, 379 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Thompson v.
Gleason, 317 F.2d 901 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Electric Motors, Inc. v. Jones, 153 F.2d
134 (D.C. Cir. 1946). But see Milliken v. Gleason, 332 F.2d 122 (1st Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1002 (1965); Sinkio v. United States, 271 F.2d 846
(D.C. Cir. 1959); French v. War Contracts Price Adjustment Bd., 182 F.2d 560
(9th Cir. 1950).
33. See Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968); Estep v.
United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946); Wolff v. Selective Serv. Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d
817 (2d Cir. 1967); DAvis §§ 28.10, 28.12; JAFFE 356.
34. In fact, an argument can be made that the statute contemplates review of
agency decisions made pursuant thereto. Section 102(1) of NEPA "directs that,
to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the
United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies
set forth in this chapter . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) (emphasis added).
Unlike the procedural requirements of section 102(2) which is specifically directed
to agencies, the language of section 102(1) is not so limited. Furthermore, the
word "interpreted," found in section 102(1), is a term normally associated with
judicial interpretation of statutes. From the fact that section 102(1) is not ex-
pressly limited to agencies and from the fact that section 102(1) requires that the
laws be interpreted in accordance with the policies of section 101, it can be in-
ferred that NEPA, instead of precluding review, actually contemplates it.
35. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-41 (1967), quoting
Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962).
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vor of review. 36  Just as the statutory language is silent as to the
precluding of judicial review, the legislative history contains no
evidence whatsoever showing a congressional intent to foreclose
judicial review of agency decisions under section 101 of NEPA.87
The second area of agency activity excepted from judicial re-
view under section 10 of the APA is action committed to agency
discretion by law .3  The Supreme Court has considered the appli-
cation of this exception39 and has cautioned that
[t]his is a very narrow exception. The legislative history of the
[APA] indicates that it is applicable in those rare instances where
"statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there
is no law to apply."40
Therefore, the question is whether in section 101 there is "law to
apply."
The landmark decision on this question is Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.41 In Overton Park the plaintiffs con-
tended that the Secretary of Transportation had exceeded his statu-
tory authority by authorizing the expenditure of federal funds for
the construction of a highway through a park. The statutes in
question provided that the Secretary shall not approve any highway
program or project which requires the use of any parkland "unless
(1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such
land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to mini-
mize harm to such park . ,,. The Court, narrowly constru-
36. JAFFE 374. But see DAvis § 28.08.
37. The legislative history clearly indicates that section 102(1), in conjunction
with the goals set forth in section 101, was intended to make substantive changes in
decision making. See S. REP. No. 296, supra note 8, at 19-20. Just as the pro-
cedural changes mandated by section 102(2) are subject to judicial review, the sub-
stantive changes mandated by section 102(1) should be subject to judicial review.
38. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
39. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
Before the Supreme Court considered this exception in Overton Park, a fierce
academic battle had raged between Professors Davis, Berger, and Saferstein as to
the correct interpretation of the statute. See, e.g., Berger, Administrative Arbitrari-
ness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness
and Judicial Review, 65 COLmM. L. knv. 55 (1965); Davis, Administrative Ar.
bitrariness is Not Always Reviewable, 51 MmsN. L. Rav. 643 (1967); Saferstein,
Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82
H v. L. REv. 367 (1968).
40. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)
(citations omitted).
41. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
42. Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970) (emphasis added);
Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970) (emphasis added).
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ing the statutory language of these acts,4 3 rejected the view that the
statutes were merely directives not intended to limit the Secretary's
discretion.4 4 Noting that the statutes limited the Secretary's dis-
cretion,45 and implicitly recognizing that the reviewing court must
ascertain whether the administrator has acted within that narrowed
discretion,46 the Court ruled that "plainly there is 'law to apply.' ""
An analysis of the Court's reasoning in Overton Park reveals
that there will be "law to apply" if the statute in question limits or
alters an administrator's discretion and is not merely a statute which
authorizes the discretionary consideration of statutory factors in
the decision-making process.48  As noted,49 in Environmental De-
fense Fund the court of appeals concluded that, in light of the statu-
tory language and legislative history, NEPA mandates substantive
changes in decision-making 50--- commanding that national environ-
mental goals be given weight in the ultimate agency decision.51 The
legislative history also indicates that, despite the broad language of
the environmental goals,52 these goals were defined in "operational
terms"58 so that the agencies and courts could consider and act
upon them. 4 Thus, Congress "desired a reordering of priorities,
43. For discussion of the legislative history and the strict construction which
the Supreme Court gave to the statutes, see The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85
H v. L. REv. 315 (1972); 1971 Duke Project 317.
44. 401 U.S. at 412 & n.28.
45. Id. at 411-13.
46. See id. at 416.
47. Id. at 413. The Court held that the Secretary could approve the use of
parkland for highway construction only where "truly unusual factors were present
in a particular case if the cost or community disruption resulting from alternative
routes reached extraordinary magnitudes." Id.
48. For a fuller discussion of the concept of "law to apply," see Supreme
Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. Rnv. 315, 316-18 (1971); 60 GEo. L.J. 1101 (1972).
49. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
50. 470 F.2d at 297. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
51. 470 F.2d at 298.
52. The legislative history indicates that:
[a] statement of national policy for the environment-like other major
policy declarations-is in large measure concerned with principle rather
than detail; with an expression of broad national goals rather than narrow
and specific procedures for implementation. S. REP. No. 296, supra note
8, at 9.
53. Id. at 13.
54. Id. Senator Jackson, sponsor of NEPA in the Senate, declared during
discussion of the measure:
A statement of environmental policy is more than a statement of what we
believe as a people and as a nation. It establishes priorities and gives ex-
pression to our national goals and aspirations. It provides a statutory
foundation to which administrators may refer. . . for guidance in making
decisions which find environmental values in conflict with other values.
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so that environmental cost and benefits will assume their proper
place along with other considerations."' 5  To the extent that NEPA
requires agencies to reorder priorities and give weight to environ-
mental considerations, the Act demands a substantive change in
agency decision-making and constrains the exercise of discretion.
These changes and limitations provide the necessary "law to apply"
and permit the courts to review the merits of agency decisions in or-
der to assure that those decisions are made within the now nar-
rowed scope of discretion under the agency's authorizing statute.
Standard of Judicial Review
In the absence of an express statutory standard of judicial re-
view to be applied to substantive agency decisions under NEPA,
courts have varied in their selection of a proper standard. 0 Two
recent major cases typify the differing approaches.
Standards of Review Applied Under Section 101. In Cal-
115 CONG. RE . 40416 (1969).
Also see id. at 19009 (remarks of Senator Jackson). He further stated:
If an environmental policy is to become more than rhetoric, and if the
studies and advice of any high-level, advisory group are to be translated
into action, each of these agencies must be enabled and directed to par-
ticipate in active and objective-oriented environmental management. Con-
cern for environmental quality must be made part of every phase of
Federal Action. Id. at 29087.
55. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). Accord, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d
289 (8th Cir. 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972). Senator
Jackson has expressed the same view. See note 54 supra.
56. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Conservation Council v.
Froehlke, - F.2d -, - (4th Cir. 1973), rev'g 340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C. 1972),
ruled that substantive review of agency decisions under NEPA is limited to deter-
mining whether the agency reached its decision after a full, good faith consideration
of environmental factors and whether the actual decision reached was arbitrary and
capricious or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental factors. Accord,
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1972).
In City of New York v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 929 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(dictum), the court noted that substantive review under NEPA is extremely lim-
ited. The court seriously doubted that the agency decision should be reviewed un-
der a substantial evidence test; rather, the arbitrary and capricious standard of re-
view, which is more limited, appeared appropriate. Id. at 939-40. Accord, Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972),
utilized a substantial evidence test in reviewing an agency decision. However,
since the impact statement in this case was prepared in conjunction with an ad-
judicatory hearing on the same issues mandated by another statute, id. at 465, the




vert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC,57 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit indicated that, although the judici-
ary has the power and duty to review the correctness of an agency de-
cision, "reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive
decision on its merits, under section 101, unless it be shown that the
actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary
or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values.""6
The court reasoned that, unlike the inherently inflexible and rig-
orously enforced procedural requirements of section 102,59 the sub-
stantive policies of section 101 are flexible because the agency in
pursuit of its objectives has only to "use all practicable means, con-
sistent with other essential considerations of national policy."60
Therefore, section 101 "leaves room for responsible exercise of
[agency] discretion" to balance environmental costs against eco-
nomic and technical considerations.". The agency's balancing of
these factors can only be set aside, the court concluded, if the re-
sult is "arbitrary and capricious."6 2
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers,3
a 1972 case decided by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
agreed with the Calvert Cliffs' conclusion that the actual agency de-
cision could be set aside only if the decision were arbitrary or ca-
pricious.6 4 However, the Environmental Defense Fund court felt
that an additional inquiry was essential: Was the decision within
the scope of the agency's authority as limited by NEPA?65 Under
this bifurcated test, the reviewing court must first determine
whether the agency had "reached its decision after a full, good faith
consideration and balancing of environmental factors, 66 second,
57. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
58. Id. at 1115.
59. Id. at 1114.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1113-14.
62. Id. at 1115.
63. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
64. Id. at 300.
65. Id.
66. Id. In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
again held that there was substantive review of agency decisions under section 101
of NEPA. The court, while reiterating the same test as set forth in the EDF
decision, stated that the agency decision could only be substantively reviewed un-
der an arbitrary and capricious standard. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Froehlke, - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1972). The portion of the Eighth Circuit's recent
decision setting forth the two-level test was recently quoted and cited by the Fourth
Circuit in holding that there was substantive review under NEPA. Conservation
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the court must decide whether the balance of cost and benefits as
the agency found them clearly gave insufficient weight to environ-
mental factors or was arbitrary and capricious. 7  The Eighth Cir-
cuit summarily balanced the benefits to be derived from flood con-
trol in this project against the detriment of a less diversified envi-
ronment. Taking this balancing into account, the Environmental
Defense Fund court concluded that the agency decision was not ar-
bitrary and capricious.""
Standard of Review: Analysis. In the absence of a statutory
provision specifying a particular standard of review, the APA pro-
vides a basic framework for judicial review. Section 706(2)(A)
Council v. Froehlke, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1973), rev'g 340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C.
1972).
67. 470 F.2d at 300.
68. Id. at 301. The factors weighing in favor of completion included benefits
to be derived from flood control and the fact that the project was already 63 per
cent completed. Opposing these benefits was the detriment of a less diversified
environment. However, the ineffectiveness of this test can be seen by reviewing
the district court judge's findings of fact and unwillingness to believe the Corps'
impact statement. Judge Eisele said:
The impact statement concludes that the project will have the effect of en-
hancing the water quality of the Cossatot. The plaintiffs' evidence, which
is persuasive, indicates that the quality of the water of the Cossatot in
its natural state could hardly be improved upon ....
The environmental impact statement suggests that the project will
result in enhanced fish and wildlife benefits. A value judgment here de-
pends upon the yardstick used, but plaintiffs have made a substantial
showing that impoundment will result in a downstream eco-system that
is less diverse and less stable . ... The testimony also convinces the
Court that the embankment, while it might not decrease the total volume
of fish life, will reduce the quality and the variety of fish life ....
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728, 746-47
(E.D. Ark. 1971). See also 325 F. Supp. at 760-62 (illustrating more instances
in which the judge, although considering himself powerless, disagreed with the Corps'
conclusions).
Professor Jaffe has noted:
A prime function of the courts is to give these values an operative form.
Thus, courts should conclude that a serious environmental impact must be
justified by relevant and weighty considerations. This is, in a sense, a
burden-of-proof rule, and we know that a skillful manipulation of such
burdens can be decisive. Jaffe, Book Review, 83 H.Iv. L. RLv. 1562,
1564 (1971).
In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 407 U.S. 926, denying cert.
to 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1970), Justice Douglas asserted in his dissent:
Although value judgments are inevitable and even though the Com-
mission's balancing of environmental costs with other factors may be enti-
tled to some deference, I share Judge Timbers' doubts that under § 101
the balance struck by an agency unskilled in environmental matters should
be reviewed only through the lens of the "substantial evidence" test.
Id. at 931 (dissenting opinion).
The rest of the discussion in this section will concern one possible way in which
the courts can control administrative decisions affecting the environment.
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of the APA provides that a court can set aside agency action which
is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 9 As to this stand-
ard of review, both the Calvert Cliffs' court and the EDF court
are in agreement. 70 However, the APA also provides in section 706
(2)(C) that agency action may be set aside if that action is in ex-
cess of statutory authority or jurisdiction.7 1
In Overton Park, the Supreme Court carefully examined the
scope and application of these provisions. As noted,72 the Court
found that the statutes involved had severely limited the Secre-
tary's discretion with regard to the use of parkland for road construc-
tion. The Court interpreted the statutes as giving the preservation
of parkland paramount importance and as severely limiting the
range of choices that the Secretary could make.73  To review the
propriety of the Secretary's decision, the Court formulated a bifur-
cated standard of review. The first level of the test refers to the
situation set forth in section 706(2)(C) of the APA-action taken
in excess of statutory authority.74 The determination of whether
the Secretary acted within his authority
naturally begins with a delineation of the scope of the Secretary's
authority and discretion .... Also involved in this initial inquiry
is a determination of whether on the facts the Secretary's decision
can reasonably be said to be within that range. The reviewing court
must consider whether the Secretary properly construed his author-
ity .... 75
Therefore, application of the first-level test to agency action under
NEPA must begin with a determination of the degree to which
NEPA now limits an agency's discretion.76
69. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
70. See text accompanying notes 58, 67 supra.
71. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1970).
72. See notes 41-46 supra and accompanying text.
73. 401 U.S. at 416. For a discussion of the narrow range of choices left the
Secretary, see 1971 Duke Project 317; 60 GEO. L.J. 1101 (1972).
74. 401 U.S. at 415.
75. Id. at 415-16 (emphasis added).
76. In Overton Park, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statutes in-
volved left the Secretary with only a small range of permissible choices. See text
accompanying note 73 supra. However, the fact that under NEPA an agency has a
wider range from which to choose does not mean that any given choice is within
that range. The Secretary was prohibited from approving funds unless certain con-
ditions were fulfilled: The fact that his authority was limited in a negative way-
that is, he could not spend money unless he found certain conditions to exist-
should not be an important distinction. The Supreme Court indicated that the de-
termination of whether the Secretary was within his authority begins with de-
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Section 101 of NEPA states that it is a continuing federal re-
sponsibility "to use all practicable means, consistent with other
essential considerations of national policy" 77 to achieve six enu-
merated environmental goals .7  This phrase led the Calvert Cliffs'
court to the conclusion that, unlike the inflexible procedural re-
quirements of section 102(2) which must be complied with to the
"fullest extent possible," the substantive policies of NEPA are flex-
ible.7 9  However, the imperative language of section 102(1)
requires that the agencies "shall" "to the fullest extent possible ...
administer" their laws in accordance with the policies set forth in
NEPA.80  The phrase "to the fullest extent possible,"81 which ap-
applies to both subsections 102(1) and 102(2), has been narrowly
construed to mean "the fullest extent unless there is a clear con-
flict of statutory authority. '8 2  Thus, a more balanced reading
of section 101 in conjunction with section 102 would require agen-
cies, "to the fullest extent possible," "to use all practicable means,
consistent with other essential considerations of national policy,"
in order to achieve a quality environment. Therefore, the flexibility
that Calvert Cliffs' found was permitted by the "practicable means"
language of section 101(b) is limited by the language "to the full-
est extent possible" of section 102(1).8
fining the scope of his authority. See text accompanying note 75 supra. Thus, a
positive grant of circumscribed authority should be indistinguishable from a withhold-
ing of authority unless certain conditions are met. One court has so held in a
different factual context. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th
Cir. 1973).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970) (emphasis added). For the full text of this
section, see note 9 supra.
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(b)(1)-(6) (1970). For the full text of this section,
see note 9 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) (emphasis added). For the full text of this
section, see note 11 supra.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
82. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). Accord, Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Ely v.
Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
Further, Senator Jackson, one of the sponsors of NEPA, has stated:
If there are to be departures from this standard of excellence they should
be the exceptions to the rule and the policy. And as exceptions, they will
have to be justified in light of public scrutiny as required by section 102.
115 CONG. REc. 40416 (1969).
See 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1970) (guidelines issued by the Council on Environ-
mental Quality).
83. Compare Warren & Cohen, Judicial Recognition of the Substantive Require-
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The effect of the "practicable means" clause of section 101 (b),
however, is unlike that of the statutes construed in Overton Park.84
As the Calvert Cliffs' court correctly pointed out, NEPA provides
only for a reordering of priorities and does not make environmen-
tal concerns an exclusive goal.85 Thus, an agency or administrator
under NEPA has a somewhat broader range of choices than did the
Secretary in Overton Park. Nevertheless, an agency still must use
"all practicable means, consistent with other essential considera-
tions of national policy . .".8.6 This analysis is neither the same
as balancing environmental costs against economic and technical
considerations of construction, as suggested in Calvert Cliffs',87 nor
the same as balancing the benefits to accrue from a dam as against
the environmental consequences, as was done in EDF.8  The
approach reflected in these two decisions is a balancing of benefits
and detriments of an individual project; NEPA, however, requires
the government to use all practicable means to achieve the environ-
mental goals of section 101(b) consistent with other essential con-
siderations of national policy.8 9
According to this analysis, the proper standard of review un-
der NEPA would be the bifurcated test of Overton Park. First, as
EDF and Calvert Cliffs' point out,90 there should be a balancing
of the benefits to be gained against the damage to be caused by
any individual project.9 1 Second, a determination must be made as
to whether the national policy in favor of environmental protection
predominates over the national policy or policies to be served by
ments of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
REV. 685 (1972).
84. See notes 41-46, 72-73 supra and accompanying text.
85. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970) (emphasis added). For the full text of this
section, see note 9 supra.
The section-by-section analysis in the pertinent Senate report also states:
Wherever adverse environmental effects are found to be involved
• . . a finding must be made that the action leading to the adverse en-
vironmental effects is justified by other considerations of national policy
. ... S. REP. No. 296, supra note 8, at 20.
87. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
88. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
89. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (B) (1970). For the full text of this sec-
tion of the Act, see note 11 supra.
90. See notes 61, 68 supra and accompanying text.
91. Of course, the alternative which offers the most benefits for the least
costs, including environmental costs, is necessarily the preferred choice. In fact,
any agency admission to the contrary would surely be arbitrary and capricious.
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accomplishment of the project.92  The reviewing court must con-
sider whether the agency reasonably construed the statutes at is-
sue and attributed the proper weight to the national policies in-
volved.93 If environmental protection is a far stronger policy than
that which would be served by a continuation of the project, then
the administrator's choice of courses of action is limited to those
choices in which benefits from the project substantially outweigh
the environmental detriments. The alternatives available to the ad-
ministrator will depend on the relative strength of the competing
policy offsetting the policy in favor of environmental protection.
As set forth in Overton Park,94 the standard of review to be ap-
plied is whether the agency or administrator could reasonably be-
lieve that its choice fell within the permissive range.
Once a court determines that the choice made could reason-
ably be thought to fall within the permissible range, the court will
review the decision only to determine whether the agency's choice
was reached in an arbitrary and capricious manner.95 As the Su-
preme Court cautioned in Overton Park, this is a narrow standard
of review which does not allow the courts to substitute their judgment
for the agency's. 96  This standard does, however, require a care-
92. Section 101(b) states that the agency "must use all practicable means,
consistent with other essential considerations of national policy .... ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 4331(b) (1970) (emphasis added). For the full text of this section, see note 9
supra. The word "essential" would seem to indicate that the environmental policy
is a strong one. Professor Jaffe comments that
filn the present climate of public opinion, which is being more and more
reflected in statutes such as NEPA, the courts in the exercise of their
lawmaking function should give environmental considerations a very high
priority. Jaffe, Book Review, 84 HARv. L. Rv. 1562, 1563-64 (1971)(footnotes omitted).
93. Although the APA commands that "the reviewing court shall determine
all relevant questions of law . . . ," 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970), the courts do give some
deference to an agency's interpretation and application of a statute. However, it is
the courts which ultimately must decide what interpretation would best serve the
congressional intent. Cf. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 415-17 (1971). This would seem particularly to be true of a statute in
which the construing agency has not been given primary administrative responsi-
bility.
For a discussion of the law-fact distinction as it relates to NEPA, see Sive,
supra note 8, at 619-31.
94. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
95. 401 U.S. at 416.
96. Id. Jaffe points out that
if a legislature chooses to confer a power-be it a power to build roads or
to license the use of the public domain-on an administrative officer, there
is simply no basis for the exercise of the power by a court. The doctrine
of limited judicial review expresses this fundamental premise of our Con-
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ful inquiry into the facts to ascertain whether the agency: (1) con-
sidered all relevant factors and (2) did not make a clear error of
judgment in reaching its decision.9 7  An admission by an agency
or a finding by the court that an agency has chosen a course of ac-
tion which does not maximize benefits (including environmental
benefits) as against costs (including technical, environmental, and
monetary costs) would clearly be arbitrary and capricious. Fur-
ther, if the balancing by the agency, reflected in its decision, clearly
gave insufficient weight to environmental costs, this agency action
would have to be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. In sum,
then, this very relaxed standard leaves the agency broad discretion
to find facts and engage in a balancing of the costs and benefits to
accrue from any choice of action.
stitution. It is on this premise that a court is limited to questions of law,
abuse of discretion, or lack of adequate evidence. Jaffe, Book Review, 84
HARV. L. Rsv. 1562, 1568 (1971).
97. 401 U.S. at 416. It might be argued, however, that this second-level deter-
mination should be subject to the substantial-evidence standard of review; alterna-
tively, if the proposed construction of the Act given in the text is rejected, it might
be argued that the entire agency determination should be subject to a substantial-
evidence test. Section 706(2) (E) of the APA, which requires the court to set aside
an agency decision "unsupported by substantial evidence in a case . . . reviewed on
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute," provides the necessary authority.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970). The Supreme Court in Overton Park said that a
record that is the basis of agency action is the fundamental requirement for the sub-
stantial-evidence test. 401 U.S. at 415. Section 102(2) (C) of NEPA requires an
agency to prepare a "detailed statement" whenever a major federal undertaking may
have a significant impact on the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
The production of an impact statement, which the courts have rigorously enforced
as a procedural requirement of NEPA, could provide the basis for review under this
standard. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
Recently, the courts have required agencies to include opposing viewpoints in
their impact statements. See, e.g., Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v.
Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971). For a fuller discussion of recent court
decisions on the required contents of an impact statement, see Memorandum for
Agency and General Liaison on National Environmental Policy Act Matters, 2 ELI
ENVMONMENTAL L. REP. 46162 (1972). In Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 647
(2d Cir), cert denied, Hanly v. Kleindienst, 409 U.S. 990 (1972), the court noted that
NEPA requires "federal agencies to affirmatively develop a reviewable environmental
record . . . ." In Hanly v. Kleindienst, F.2d (2d Cir. 1972), the court went
even further in demanding a reviewable record. These holdings, however, relate
only to the section 102(2) (C) threshold determination of whether to issue an
impact statement. But the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently said
that "the formal impact study supplies a convenient record for courts to use in re-
viewing agency decisions on the merits to determine if they are in accord with the
substantive policies of NEPA." Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke,
- F.2d -, - (8th Cir. 1972). Therefore, this impact statement might be con-
sidered a record upon which the agency bases its action. If so, the agency findings
might be subject to a substantial-evidence test.
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